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RECIDIVIST STATUTES AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
A DISPROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973)
Prior to the sentencing of defendant on a perjury conviction, the
state charged him with being an habitual criminal. The charge' was
based on defendant's two previous convictions: (1) for writing a check
on insufficient funds in the amount of $50; and (2) for trans-
porting forged checks in the amount of $140. Defendant was
convicted under the West Virginia recidivist statute, and the manda-
tory life sentence was imposed.2  The federal district court denied de-
fendant's application for a writ of habeas corpus, 3 but the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed. Held: As applied to defendant, the
mandatory life sentence imposed by the West Virginia recidivist stat-
ute was so disproportionate to the underlying offenses that it consti-
tuted a violation of the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.4
1. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1454
(1974).
2. W. VA. CoDEANN. § 61-11-18 (1966):
When it is determined, as provided in section nineteen hereof, that such per-
son shall have been twice before convicted in the United States of a crime
punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, the person shall be sentenced to
be confined in the penitentiary for life.
3. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1454
1974).
4. Id. Both of Hart's prior convictions were punishable by confinement in a peni-
tentiary as provided in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966).
Judge Boreman, dissenting in Hart, believed that holding the statute unconstitutional
as applied was an incorrect application of the "unconstitutional-as-applied" doctrine,
that Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), upheld the statute as valid on
its face, and that based on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), the
doctrine applies only to cases in which there is too much discretion in the administra-
tion of the statute. He further pointed out that in the present case there was no room
for discretion, since the sentence and the application of the statute both were manda-
tory. 483 F.2d at 147 (dissenting opinion).
Arguably, the doctrine is more flexible than Judge Boreman contends. See Workman
v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968) (holding that as applied to juvenile of-
fenders, the Kentucky statute involved, Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 435.090 (1969), contra-
venes federal and state constitutional provisions banning cruel and unusual punish-
ment).
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Habitual criminal statutes have been enacted in most states. His-
torically, these statutes have been held constitutional, surviving attacks
based on the due process,0 equal protection," privileges and immuni-
ties,8 double jeopardy,' and ex post facto1° clauses of the Constitution.
Recidivist statutes also have generally been held immune to attacks
alleging that they constitute cruel and unusual punishment as prohib-
ited by the eighth amendment."'
5. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.050 (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1649
(Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2328 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE §
644 (Deering 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-1 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. § 53a-40 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3911(a) (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.084 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (Supp. 1972); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-2514 (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2207 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 747.5 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.190
(1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 15-529.1 (1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1742
(1964); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (1968); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1084
(1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.155 (1964); Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.280 (Supp.
1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4713 (1969); NED. REV. STAT. § 29-2221
(1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 591:1 to 651:6
(1955); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:85-12 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-5 (1953);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-7.1 to 7.6 (1969,
Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-06-18 to 06-21 (1969); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2961.11 (Page 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-21 (1970); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 22-7-1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.92.090 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-9 to -10
(Supp. 1973).
6. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962);
Ves v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 487, 376 S.W.2d 446 (1964); Surratt v. Commonwealth, 187
Va. 940, 48 S.E.2d 362 (1948).
7. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (provision for sterilization of habitual criminals found to violate equal protec-
tion clause where provision applied to persons convicted at least twice of larceny by
fraud, but exempted persons convicted of embezzlement); Graham v. West Virginia,
224 U.S. 616 (1912).
8. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311 (1901); Hunter v. State, 375 P.2d 357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
9. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51
(1914); Poppe v. State, 155 Neb. 527, 52 N.W.2d 422 (1952); State v. Gonzales, 84
N.M. 275, 502 P.2d 300 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 271, 502 P.2d 296 (Sup.
Ct. 1972); State v. LePitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 P. 27 (1909).
10. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180
U.S. 311 (1910); Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N.E. 579 (1892); Ves
v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 487, 376 S.W.2d 446 (1964).
11. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (same statute as in Hart); Mc-
Donald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Cooper v. United States, 114 F. Supp.
464 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Bennett v. State, 455 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); State
v. Fisher, 123 W. Va. 745, 18 S.E.2d 649 (1941).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/11
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Two approaches are commonly used to attack a punishment as vio-
lating the eighth amendment. 2 The traditional approach has been
to view the amendment as proscribing inherently cruel punishments."
The amendment may also be interpreted, however, as prohibiting
punishments that are disproportionate to the underlying offense;' 4 this
approach does not attack the punishment per se, but rather the ex-
cessiveness of the punishment relative to the offense charged. Argu-
ments employing this approach to attack punishments prescribed by
recidivist statutes generally have proved unsuccessful.' 5
The limited success of the disproportionality approach is attributable
in part both to judicial refusal to read the eighth amendment as relat-
ing to more than a ban on inherently cruel punishments,16 and to the
unwillingness of courts to substitute their view of what constitutes rea-
sonable punishment for that of the legislature.' 7 Moreover, the dis-
12. The constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment may also be an ab-
solute bar to the imposition of penal sanctions of any kind for certain conduct. The
Supreme Court developed this concept in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
where it held unconstitutional a statute making it a crime for a person to "be addicted
to the use of narcotics." See note 22 infra.
13. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890) (electrocution found not
inherently cruel punishment); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964); Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An
Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972).
14. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786
(4th Cir. 1970); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972)
(interpreting cruel and unusual punishment clause in state constitution).
15. This is true even where a life sentence is the punishment involved. In re Boat-
wright, 119 Cal. App. 420, 6 P.2d 972 (1931); People v. Luckey, 90 Ill. App. 2d 325,
234 N.E.2d 26 (1967), aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 115, 245 N.E.2d 769 (1968), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 942 (1970); State v. Custer, 24 Ore. 350, 401 P.2d 402 (1965). A statute nearly
identical to the one involved in Hart was recently upheld against a similar eighth
amendment attack in Bennett v. State, 455 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
16. See Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: An Examination
of the Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle, 3 CRiM. L. BULL. 145 (1967);
Wheeler, supra note 13; Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of
Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REv. 996 (1964).
17. Sansone v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1934); Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d
668 (10th Cir. 1934); Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 233 A.2d 791 (1967); Merchant
v. State, 217 Md. 61, 141 A.2d 487 (1958); see Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth
Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 846
(1961); Note, Judicial Limitations on the Constitutional Protection Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 163.
The court in Hart disapproved these judicial attitudes:
The fact that a West Virginia statute requires a life sentence does not establish
the punishment's constitutionality in a particular case. The eighth amendment
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proportionality approach is difficult to apply because of the inadequacy
of constitutional standards upon which a court might rely in determin-
ing whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" within the meaning
of the eighth amendment.18 Although the United States Supreme
Court used the disproportionality approach in Weems v. United States'
to assess the legality of a punishment dictated by a Philippine law,20
the Court merely assumed the constitutionality of punishments in
American jurisdictions to which it compared the Philippine law. 21 The
decision failed, -therefore, to provide any guidance to courts that might
employ the disproportionality approach directly to assess a statute's
constitutionality in light of the eighth amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.22
is a limitation on both legislative and judicial action.
483 F.2d at 141. Accord, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970).
18. See Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment, supra note 17; Note,
supra note 16.
19. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
20. In Weems, the defendant, a United States Coast Guard officer employed in the
Philippines, was convicted in a Philippines court (under United States authority) on
a charge of falsifying government wage statements. The defendant was sentenced for
this one crime to fifteen years hard labor in chains, forfeiture of all his civil rights,
and surveillance during the remainder of his life.
21. Justice McKenna noted that no jurisdiction in the United States would
have punished the defendant in Weems with more than two years imprisonment, and
that the punishment the defendant in fact received would not have been imposed for
even the most serious of crimes in the United States, 217 U.S. at 380-81. This com-
parative approach of measuring punishment in one jurisdiction against that im-
posed in another has proved an impractical tool for analyzing the constitutionality
of state and federal legislation. What one jurisdiction considers a cruel punishment is
not necessarily dispositive of the question as to another jurisdiction. See Note, The
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 635, 639-41 (1966).
22. Weems apparently is the only case in which the Court has utilized the dispro-
portionality approach in ruling on the legality of a statutorily prescribed punishment,
although there is some doubt whether Weems represents anything more than a ban on
inherently cruel punishment. See Packer, supra note 13, at 1075-76. The importance
of the case as an excessiveness decision may have been substantially weakened by the
fact that the punishment in question involved hard and painful labor in chains. Such
punishment appears more cruel in kind than in excessiveness. The majority in Weems
did not rely, however, on the inherently cruel argument, but read the eighth amendment
as embodying a ban on disproportionate or excessive punishments. 217 U.S. at 376-
77.
While the Court's decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), can be
interpreted as following either the inherently cruel or the disproportionality approach,
it seems more reasonable to read the decision as relating to inherently cruel punish-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/11
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In Hart v. Coiner 2 3 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted
a disproportionality approach.2 4  In deciding that the life sentence im-
posed on Hart was unconstitutionally disproportionate, the court con-
sidered three factors that it thought relevant to an analysis of the con-
stitutionality of a criminal punishment under the eighth amendment:
(1) the nature of the offense(s) charged; (2) the legislative purpose
behind the enactment of the statute; and (3) a comparison of the
punishment both with the punishment imposed in other jurisdictions
for similar crimes, and with the punishment imposed for other crimes
in the same jurisdiction.2"
The Hart court's analysis of the nature of the offense(s) charged
emphasized the non-violent nature of the offenses, noting:
Hart's first conviction was for writing a bad check in 1949, and the
second was for transporting forged checks six years later. His third
conviction was more serious--committing perjury during the murder
trial of his son. . . . None of Hart's offenses were against the person.
None involved violence or danger of violence toward persons or prop-
erty. The bad check case was very nearly trivial--one penny less in
the face amount of the check and the offense would have been a five-
to sixty-day petty misdemeanor. 26
Next the court determined that the legislative purpose underlying
ment. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for being a narcotics
addict on the ground that narcotics addiction is an illness, punishment for which is
prohibited by the eighth amendment.
Until Robinson was decided, the Weems decision had been further limited as a result
of uncertainty over whether the eighth amendment applied to the states. Turkington,
supra note 16. Turkington points out, however:
Although the Eighth Amendment had not been specifically applied to the
states before Robinson, all states except Illinois, Vermont and Connecticut
have provisions in their constitutions prohibiting cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
Id. at 148.
23. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. CL 1454 (1974).
24. The Fourth Circuit had previously recognized the disproportionality aspect of
cruel and unusual punishment in a rape case involving the death penalty. Ralph v.
Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1970).
25. Two of these standards were identical to those suggested in Justice Goldberg's
dissenting opinion in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), denying cert. to Ru-
dolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662 (1963). Goldberg proposed (1) pitting
the offense against the punishment, and (2) analyzing the constitutionality of the pun-
ishment by ascertaining whether or not the punishment goes beyond what is necessary
to achieve the aim of public intent as expressed by the legislative act. 375 U.S. at
889-91.
26. 483 F.2d at 140.
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the punishment could have been adequately served by the imposition
of a lesser penalty. The court pointed out that:
Putting Hart in prison for the remainder of his life for three offenses
that rank relatively low in the hierarchy of crimes would presumably
prevent him from passing bad checks but would not likely make of
him a truthful man. . . . Life imprisonment is the penultimate punish-
ment. . . . It is not a practical solution to petty crime in America ...
We think that a sentence of life imprisonment, the most severe punish-
ment available under West Virginia law, is unnecessary to accomplish
the legislative purpose to protect society from an individual who has
committed three wholly nonviolent crimes over a period of twenty
years. 27
Finally, the court undertook a comparative analysis, noting that only
three other states provide a mandatory life sentence for three-time of-
fenders, 2 and that other crimes in West Virginia are burdened with
comparatively lesser punishments.29
The Hart decision sets forth workable standards for analyzing dis-
proportionality cases. Perhaps more importantly, however, it applies
those standards to a recidivist statute, an area of the law heretofore
practically untouched by the courts. The factual situation in Hart
emphasizes the need for a liberal injection-especially where a man-
datory life sentence is involved-of judicial discretion into the applica-
tion of sentences under state recidivist statutes.30
27. Id. at 141.
28. Indiana and Kentucky also provide mandatory life sentences for three-time fel-
ony offenders. IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-2207 (1956); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.190
(1969). Texas, which had a similar provision at the time of the Hart decision, has
amended its statute to eliminate the mandatory imposition of a life sentence. Ch.
399, § 12.42, [1973] Tex. Laws 908, amending TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (1952).
29. See Brown, West Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 30
(1956), for a discussion of the relative harshness of the West Virginia recidivist statute.
tence jurisdictions provide perhaps the most plausible forum for the application and
30. See Note, supra note 21, at 645, indicating that the mandatory life sen-
tence jurisdictions provide perhaps the most plausible forum for the application and
further cultivation of a workable eighth amendment disproportionality principle.
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